Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment by Massey, Calvin R.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 38 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1987
Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth
Amendment
Calvin R. Massey
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 Hastings L.J. 305 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol38/iss2/2
Federalism and Fundamental Rights:
The Ninth Amendment
by
CALVIN R. MASSEY*
I. Introduction
Two decades after its emergence from 175 years of constitutional
hibernation, the ninth amendment continues to perplex those who seek
meaning within it. The amendment was largely ignored by litigants and
judges until Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan, fastened upon it as a basis for concurring in the Court's invali-
dation of state prohibition of contraceptive use in 1965.1 As the nation
prepares to enter its third century of constitutional interpretation, and
issues of personal liberty and the proper distribution of political power
between state and federal government occupy a central place on the judi-
cial agenda, it is appropriate to examine, once again,2 this "almost un-
* Member, California Bar. A.B. 1969, Whitman College; M.B.A. 1971, Harvard Uni-
versity; J.D. 1974, Columbia University.
1. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justices Harlan and White each con-
curred separately in the Court's judgment. Id. at 499, 502. Justices Black and Stewart dis-
sented. Id. at 507, 527. Justice Douglas authored the Court's opinion, in which he dared not
venture as far as Justice Goldberg, preferring merely to include the ninth amendment among
the provisions of the Bill of Rights that have "penumbras, formed by emanations from [such]
guarantees." Id. at 484.
Only seven Supreme Court cases prior to Griswold dealt in any fashion with the ninth
amendment: Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1957); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller
Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-96 (1947);
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939); Ashwan-
der v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393, 511 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring); Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 469, 551 (1833) (in which the Court's reference to the "ninth article of amendment" is
unclear and may refer to the ninth proposed amendment, the seventh amendment enacted).
2. The earliest scholarly study of the ninth amendment seems to be Kelsey, The Ninth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936). In the years from 1791 to
1936, only passing references were made to the ninth amendment by commentators. See, e.g.,
J. BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 184 (2d
ed. 1834) (ninth amendment reflective of intent to prevent "unauthorized extension" of federal
government's power); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36-37 (3d ed. 1898) (ninth amend-
ment does not create rights but recognizes existing rights and operates to preserve them); S.
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fathomable ' 3 constitutional provision.
When approaching the ninth amendment, problems seem to be le-
gion. Is it superfluous? Is it merely a rule of construction? On its face it
would seem to be so, for the amendment provides simply that
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.4
Is it, as Dunbar and Berger contend, a declaration of an area in which
government has "no power"? 5 What was intended by its framers? Does
it incorporate "natural law" theories of individual rights? If so, how can
those rights be divined in any principled way? May it be enforced by the
courts? Does it operate to prohibit state, as well as federal, action?6 Is it
overridden by explicit constitutional grants of power to the federal gov-
ernment?7 Answers to these vexing questions are not easy. Indeed any
MILLER, LECTURES ON THE CONSTITUTION 650 (1891) (ninth amendment serves as a 'just"
rule of construction which would exist even in its absence); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 751-52 (1st ed. 1833) (amendment confirms that
unenumerated rights not surrendered to federal government); 2 H. TUCKER, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 688-89 (1899) (ninth amendment excludes inference that federal
government could invade "great fundamental rights of the people").
A mass of literature pertaining to the ninth amendment has now developed. Some of the
recent works are: C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST (1980); M. GOODMAN, THE NINTH AMENDMENT 34-41 (1981); Berger, The
Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1980); Caplan, The History and Meaning of the
Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223 (1983); Gibbons, Keynote Address, Symposium: Con-
stitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 260, 272-73 (1981);
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 365-67 (1981); Note, The Right
of Privacy: A Black View of Griswold v. Connecticut, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1980);
Estreicher, Book Review, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547 (1981) (reviewing J. ELY, supra); Van Al-
styne, Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the Ninth Amendment (Book Review), 91 YALE L.J.
207 (1981) (reviewing C. BLACK, supra).
3. Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of
Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197, 207 (1965).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. At least two commentators have thought the amendment
was nothing more than a rule of construction. E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 63
(1957), concludes that the ninth amendment "was designed to obviate the possibility of apply-
ing the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one [right] is the exclusion
of alternative [rights]) in interpreting the Constitution." Justice Story believed that the ninth
amendment "was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication
of the well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all
others." J. STORY, supra note 2, at 951.
5. Berger, supra note 2, at 9; Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42
VA. L. REV. 627, 635-36 (1956).
6. There is no direct holding on the applicability of the ninth amendment to the states.
Lessee of Livingston" v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551-52 (1833), denied generally that the
Bill of Rights extended to the states. See also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242 (1833),
decided in the same term. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); infra text
accompanying notes 110-25.
7. Justice Reed certainly thought so.
[W]hen objection is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights
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answer proposed will inevitably implicate other areas of constitutional
interpretation. Because of the enigmatic nature of the amendment and
its helix-like intertwining with other powers and guarantees specified in
the Constitution, it is uncommonly difficult to find within it a coherent
package of guaranteed fights susceptible to judicial protection without
reference to unmanageable, standardless, and amorphous extrinsic
sources. Yet, there is a thread that, when followed faithfully, produces a
comprehensive, principled, and historically consistent theory of both the
content of the ninth amendment and the enforceability of its guarantees.
II. Historical Background
The ninth amendment cannot be properly understood without an
appreciation of the historical circumstances which gave rise to its adop-
tion. The Articles of Confederation reflected revolutionary America's
deep distrust of centralized authority and strong predilection to retain
separate sovereignty for each of the newly independent former colonies.
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was unable to levy taxes
or tariffs and required unanimity of the constituent states to exercise
what little authority was vested in it.8 As a result, the American "na-
tion" formed by the Articles was fragmented by state jealousies, rival
tariffs, artificial barriers to trade, and lack of a national currency or
credit.9 These conditions effectively plunged the nation into economic
depression as well as social and economic isolation. l
The Constitutional Convention proposed to remedy this situation by
reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward
the granted power under which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power
is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments, must fail.
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947).
8. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 90 (P. Ford ed. 1904)
[hereinafter JOURNALS]; see also 1 A. BEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 304 (1916).
9. Examples of protective tariffs enacted by states and directed against their fellow states
include Virginia's imposition of duties on articles imported by land or sea and providing for
forfeiture upon violation. Va. Stat. at Large, ch. 14, at 46 (1785). Pennsylvania imposed simi-
lar duties on American, non-Pennsylvania manufacturers. 1785 Pa. Laws 99.
"The financial situation was chaos." I A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 295. Each state
issued its own paper currency which was virtually worthless and unacceptable outside its state
of issuance. Id. at 296. Interstate trade was predictably strangled. New Yorkers discounted
New Jersey money at an "unconscionable" rate, 3 J. JAY, CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC
PAPERS (H. Johnston ed. 1890), and New Jersey merchants adjusted prices accordingly if
buyers tendered New York currency. Id. See generally 1 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 295-
311.
10. See generally I A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 250-311.
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the creation of a strong national government."1 But this radical proposal
was not received with anything like acclamation by the early citizens of
our nation. In Pennsylvania, for example, the ratification convention
was selected by less than ten percent of the eligible voters. This condi-
tion came about because the pro-ratification forces called the elections in
such a way and on such short notice that, as a practical matter, the citi-
zens of Pennsylvania were disenfranchised in selecting their representa-
tives for the ratification convention. 12 Similarly, in Massachusetts public
opinion was so overwhelmingly against the Constitution that some forty-
six towns refused to send a delegate to the state ratification convention.
Had those forty-six communities been represented, it is a virtual cer-
tainty that Massachusetts would have refused to ratify the new Constitu-
tion. 13 In Virginia, perhaps the most pivotal state of all, it was
acknowledged that, south of the James River, public opinion was at least
nine to one against adoption of the new Constitution.14 In New York,
public opinion was also overwhelmingly against ratification. 15 In all
probability, apart from Delaware, Rhode Island, and New Jersey, which
regarded the new Constitution as a way of achieving enhanced economic
and political leverage,16 public opinion throughout the original states was
substantially opposed to adoption of the new document.' 7 Opposition to
the Constitution's adoption was rooted in a deep fear of national power. 18
This sentiment, pervasive throughout the early American states, ulti-
11. In writing Washington in April 1787, Madison declared that
the national Government should be armed with positive and compleat authority in
all cases which require uniformity; such as the regulation of trade .... Over and
above this positive power, a negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of
the States, as to heretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be
absolutely necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdic-
tions. Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be given on paper
will be evaded and defeated. The States will continue to invade the National juris-
diction, to violate treaties and the law of nations & to harass each other with rival
and spiteful measures dictated by mistaken views of interest.
2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 345-46 (G. Hunt ed. 1904) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter MADISON WRITINGS]. This ultra-nationalist view sheds light on Madison's real
desires when introducing the ninth amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 25-31.
12. 1 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 327.
13. Id. at 340 & n.4. Massachusetts ratified the Constitution by a vote of 187 to 168. Id.
at 348; 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 178-81 (2d ed. 1836).
14. 1 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 367, 468-70; 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 587-96;
5 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 11, at 120-22, 302.
15. 1 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 379.
16. Id. at 325.
17. Id. at 307-09, 324-25; 5 J. MARSHALL, LIFE OF WASHINGTON 132 (1st ed. 1807).
18. 1 A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 342-47 ("National Government would destroy...
liberties... [and was thought to be] a kind of foreign rule.").
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mately compelled proposal and adoption of the first ten amendments to
the Constitution.' 9 Indeed, ratification was obtained in part by the
promise that a bill of rights would be promptly appended to the newly
adopted Constitution.20
The purpose of the demanded bill of rights was to provide certainty
that the newly created federal government would be disabled from in-
truding upon the elementary and fundamental rights of the citizenry.21
There does not appear to have been disagreement over this objective.
Rather, dispute centered upon the wisdom of including any enumeration
of rights within the Constitution. Those who preferred the unamended
version of the Constitution argued that any enumeration of rights would
necessarily be imperfect and would create the inference that no rights
existed except those itemized. The federal government possessed only
certain enumerated powers, according to this argument, and thus could
have no valid claim to interfere with the exercise of the citizens' rights.
Adherents to this view, including Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson
of Pennsylvania, contended that it was better to imperfectly enumerate
the powers of the federal government with the implication that powers
not enumerated were reserved to the people, than to attempt an imper-
fect enumeration of rights reserved to the people, with the implication
that rights not so reserved were impliedly delegated to the federal
government.22
The opposition contended that any creation of a government by the
people carried with it a delegation to that government of all rights not
expressly reserved for the people. 23 Whatever its wisdom, the latter ar-
gument was the stronger and, accordingly, James Madison assumed re-
sponsibility for introducing into the first Congress constitutional
amendments responsive to demands for an articulated bill of rights. 24 In
an attempt to deal with the concern that any enumeration of rights
would imply that the enumeration was exhaustive, Madison introduced
his fourth resolution which, after considerable revision, became the ninth
amendment:
19. See generally Patrick Henry's two remarkable speeches on the penultimate day of the
Virginia convention, June 24, 1788, reprinted in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 587-625; see also
infra notes 26 & 58.
20. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 464 (J. Gales & W. Seaton ed. 1836) (remarks of Elbridge
Gerry) [hereinafter ANNAL OF CONG.].
21. See infra note 59.
22. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton); 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 436-37.
23, 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 445-49 (Patrick Henry's remarks urging the Virginia
convention to consider issues of fundamental rights before considering ratification of the
Constitution).
24. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 438.
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The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just im-
portance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the
powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limitations
of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.2 5
A close comparison of Madison's resolution and its ancestors2 6 with
the final draft of the ninth amendment reveals a subtle shift of focus.
Madison's original resolution contained within it a clause that enjoined
interpreters of the Constitution from enlarging the powers delegated by
the Constitution to the federal government. This focus on powers is
missing in the final version which deals only with the rights retained by
the people. 27 The tenth amendment provides the focus missing in the
25. Id. at 435.
26. Madison's resolution owed much to Virginia's 17th proposed amendment, North
Carolina's 18th proposed amendment, the third article of Rhode Island's declaration of rights,
and New York's act of ratification. Virginia's 17th proposed amendment provided:
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers, be
not interpreted, in any manner whatsoever, to extend the powers of Congress; but
that they be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this
shall be the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution.
3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 661. North Carolina's 18th proposed amendment was identical.
4 id. at 246. New York's act of ratification provided:
That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people whensoever it shall
become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which
is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States,
or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the people of the several
states, or to their respective state governments, to whom they may have granted the
same; and that those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare that Congress
shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to
any powers not given by the said Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed
either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater
caution.
Sid. at 327. The third article of Rhode Island's declaration of rights, proclaimed as a part of
the state's act of ratification, was virtually identical. Id at 336.
Caplan contends that Virginia's 17th proposed amendment is derived from article II of
the Articles of Confederation:
Each state retains its sovereignity, freedom and independence, and every power, ju-
risdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the
United States, in Congress assembled.
9 JOURNALS, supra note 8, at 908; see Caplan, supra note 2, at 236, 254 n.132.
27. Berger contends that Madison perceived the reservation of rights in the ninth amend-
ment and limitation upon governmental powers in the tenth amendment to be indivisibly re-
lated. Berger, supra note 2, at 3. Dunbar contends that Madison was attempting to reserve
rights while simultaneously preserving power in the central government. Dunbar, supra note
5, at 635; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison).
The progenitors of the ninth amendment dealt with limitations of powers. See supra note
26; infra notes 57-58. Madison's gradual elimination of the original focus of the proposed
amendments-restriction of any implication of congressional power beyond the express grant
of the Constitution-was consistent with Madison's commitment, at the time, to a strong fed-
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ninth on limitation of powers of the federal government.28 This division
of powers and rights into separate amendments allows contemporary
analysis of the concepts of peoples' rights and governmental powers with-
out reference to each other although the amendments articulate very re-
lated concerns.29
Madison conceived of rights as of two varieties. "[T]he great object
in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting
out of the grant of power those cases in which the Government ought not
to act, or to act only in a particular mode."' 30 Thus, some rights are pro-
cedural, delimiting the manner in which the government may exercise its
powers. Examples include the right to a trial by jury and due process
assurances of notice and opportunity to be heard. Other rights are sub-
stantive prohibitions upon the ability of government to exercise its pow-
ers at all. For example, Madison thought government should be disabled
from any regulation of the press, however abusive its content.31 These
twin springs of individual rights form the source of the rights preserved
by the ninth amendment. Identification of their source, however, does
little to solve the problem of defining their content.
eral system. See I A. BEVERIDGE, supra note 8, at 312; Dunbar, supra note 5, at 634-35; supra
note 11.
28. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
U.S. CONST. amend X.
29. Madison regarded individual rights and governmental powers as separate and mutu-
ally exclusive categories. In a letter to Washington he rejected Edmund Randolph's preference
for an amendment limiting the federal government's powers rather than reserving individual
rights:
If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the rights retained, it would
seem to be the same thing, whether the latter be secured by declaring that they shall
not be abridged, or that the former shall not be extended. If no such line can be
drawn, a declaration in either form would amount to nothing.
MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 11, at 432. But Madison's observation may have have ob-
scured his desire both to retain power in the central government at the expense of the states,
see supra note 11, and to ensure that the Constitution contained "effectual provisions against
the encroachments on particular [individual] rights." I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at
433; see also Dunbar, supra note 5, at 635; THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison). But see J.
ELY, supra note 2, at 35-36 (accusing Madison of "confusion" attributable to a "failure to
recognize that rights and powers are not simply the absence of one another but that rights can
cut across or 'trump' powers."); see also C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CON-
STrrtUIONAL LAW (1969), in which Professor Black forcefully illustrates the importance of
construing any portion of the Constitution by reference to other portions of the document
which set forth the powers and structure of the federal government.
30. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 454; see also infra notes 47 & 82.
31. 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 567, 571, 573. Madison did acknowledge the common-
law power to infringe press freedom by means of actions for libel. Id.
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III. The Nature of Ninth Amendment Rights
In general, two broad, and contradictory, viewpoints exist concern-
ing the content of the ninth amendment. One maintains that the amend-
ment is a bottomless well from which can be extracted any hitherto
unarticulated private right. This view comes in two dimensions: one has
its philosophical underpinnings in natural law theories of individual
rights;32 the other is a modern construct of activist egalitarians. 33 The
contradictory position is that the ninth amendment is merely declaratory
of a truth that the people possess unspecified rights.34 This position
holds that these "rights" may neither be invaded nor protected by gov-
ernment. As two commentators have put it, the amendment merely de-
clares an area in which government has "no power. '35 Or, as another
member of this school asserts, "it simply provides that the individual
rights contained in state law are to continue in force under the Constitu-
tion until modified or eliminated by state enactment, by federal preemp-
tion, or by a judicial determination of unconstitutionality. '3 6
Each of these conceptions of the amendment's content is flawed.
The notion that the ninth amendment provides a judicially enforceable
32. B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955), is perhaps most rep-
resentative of this genre. Patterson's thesis is that the ninth amendment protects "the inherent
natural rights of the individual." Id. at 19. Patterson does not identify the source of these
rights; presumably he finds them in natural law theories of immutable and inalienable rights.
Although this may be a theoretical source, as Dunbar suggests, "they could just as well be
ascribed to the doctrine of 'the rights of Englishmen,' or to the consensus of the American
people." Dunbar, supra note 5, at 640; see infra text accompanying notes 75-81. Professor
Corwin argues that the ninth amendment illustrates natural law theories and contends that the
Constitution would not be "regarded as complete" without recognition of transcendental
rights. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt. 1), 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 153 (1928); see also Towe, Natural Law and the Ninth Amendment, 2
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 270 (1975); Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48
B.U.L. REv. 1 (1968).
33. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 2, at 44-68; J. ELY, supra note 2, at 3441; L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 570 (1978); Gibbons, supra note 2, at 272-73; Henkin,
Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1022, 1043 (1978);
Kent, Under the Ninth Amendment What Rights Are the "Others Retained by the People?, " 29
FED. B.J. 219 (1970); Moore, The Ninth Amendment-Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEWV ENG.
L. REV. 215 (1972); Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guar-
antee, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 231 (1975); Perry, Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and
Equal Protection, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 261, 272-73 (1981); Ringold, The History of the Enactment
of the Ninth Amendment and Its Recent Developments, 8 TULSA L.J. 1 (1972).
34. See, e.g., M. GOODMAN, THE NINTH AMENDMENT (1981); Berger, supra note 2;
Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695,
697; Caplan, supra note 2; Dunbar, supra note 5; Monaghan, supra note 2, at 365-67; Van
Alstyne, supra note 2.
35. Berger, supra note 2, at 9; Dunbar, supra note 5, at 641.
36. Caplan, supra note 2, at 228.
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constitutional guarantee for individual inherent rights seemingly involves
the courts in an open-ended exercise in noninterpretive judicial review.37
To the extent that this activity would further erode public support for the
judiciary, lasting damage to the fragile balance Qf power in our tripartite
system might be incalculable.38 The efficacy of judicial review is depen-
dent upon public acquiescence. 39 To endanger this keystone principle by
foraging for inherent rights among the moral controversies of the day
would seem to be foolhardy indeed. Those who urge the judiciary to use
the ninth amendment as a catapult for extending constitutional protec-
tion to all manner of personal preference no doubt believe that the result
will be an expansion of personal liberty. But should the judicial role as
bulwark against majoritarian excesses 4° be ruptured by this aggressive
strategy, a far more likely result will be a shrinkage of human liberty.
Moreover, once license is granted to incorporate extrinsic values into the
ninth amendment, there is no easy way to limit such imported values to
those expansive of personal liberty.41 Even Dean Ely, an advocate of this
view, admits that the amendment "seems open-textured enough to sup-
port almost anything one might wish to argue, and that can get pretty
scary."942
Exclusive reliance upon natural law provides an uncertain buoy for
those adrift in the sea of "open texture." Natural law theories of human
37. See generally M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(1982). Perry defines noninterpretive review as judicial review which does not engage in inter-
pretation of the Constitution itself, but which uses wholly extrinsic sources to find or make
law. These extrinsic sources may be as fleeting as current public opinion or as nebulous as the
sitting justices' private subjective values. Id. at 37-60. By contrast, interpretive review seeks
legitimacy by deriving law from the constitutional text. Id. at 61-90.
38. Consider the periodic attempts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases
involving school prayer, school busing, or any other area in which the courts have rendered
unpopular decisions. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (8 Wall.) 506 (1868) (in which Congress
successfully stripped the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over reconstruction actions of
the military authorities); A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT 99-118 (1976); P. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT (1962); L. TRIBE, CON-
STITUTIONAL CHOICES 47-65 (1985). For an unequivocal assertion of congressional power
over federal court jurisdiction, see C. BLACK, supra note 2, at 17-19, 37-39.
39. A. Cox, supra note 38, at 103-18; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962).
40. A. BICKEL, supra note 39, at 16-23.
41. For example, the ninth amendment could be read as preservative of Lochner-era indi-
vidual inherent rights. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). One commentator
would probably do just that. See B. PATTERSON, supra note 32, at 58, where he reveals his
belief that the inherent rights protected by the ninth amendment consist, in part, of individual
"protection" against public assistance and other governmental transfer payments. Those
Americans who owe their continued existence to public assistance would be surprised to learn
that their ninth amendment rights were thereby violated.
42. J. ELY, supra note 2, at 34.
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rights have been criticized as sufficiently indeterminate to provide little
guidance within the boundless dimensions of the ninth amendment as
seen by the expansionists. 43 Indeed, the modem activist egalitarians re-
ject natural law foundations for their open-ended interpretation" though
it is not historically accurate to do so.45 The American Revolution had
its intellectual underpinnings in Lockean theory,46 and the constitutional
framers, though not fettered by natural law, clearly relied upon natural
law principles in formulating constitutional guarantees.47 Though there
is little intimation in the 175 years prior to Griswold v. Connecticut 48 that
the ninth amendment was thought to be a repository of natural law,49 its
43. See Towe, supra note 32, at 273-74 (collecting arguments asserting that natural law
arguments are impossible to prove and merely provide a euphemistic disguise for naked subjec-
tive preferences).
44. See J. ELY, supra note 2, at 50. ("[Y]ou can invoke natural law to support anything
you want."); cf. C. BLACK, supra note 2, at 44, 49 (advocating an expansive reading of the
ninth amendment based on the utilitarian principle of facilitating judicial outcomes not other-
wise attainable).
45. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
46. Lockean theory posits that men are born into a "state of nature," without govern-
ment, and agree out of "strong obligations of necessity, convenience and inclination" to consti-
tute governments. The social contract thus made necessarily involves parting with some
individual (natural) rights in order to secure the remainder more effectively. J. LOCKE, Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 77, at 336-37 (P. Laslett 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698). Lockean
theory was generally accepted by such esteemed commentators as Blackstone. 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *42-44, *121-22; see also infra notes 50-57 & 198-200 and accompa-
nying text.
47. Though the framers distinguished between natural law and positive law, they were
anything but meticulous in maintaining that distinction when debating the necessity of a Bill of
Rights. Madison identified freedom of speech as a natural right but trial by jury as a positive
right, resulting from the social compact. 5 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 11, at 389 & n.1; 1
ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 454. More importantly, Madison concluded that the
positive or civil right to a jury trial was "as essential to secure the liberty of the people as any
one of the pre-existent rights of nature." Id. at 454. In urging adoption of a Bill of Rights,
both George Mason and Patrick Henry referred to "great and important" rights of humanity,
without neatly dividing them into natural and positive categories. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13,
at 317, 444; cf. infra note 129.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. None of the seven eases prior to Griswold carry any suggestion that the ninth amend-
ment raised natural law notions of individual rights to the level of a constitutional guarantee.
See cases cited supra note 1. Indeed the cases seem to adumbrate a rule confining the ninth
amendment to hortatory dimensions.
[Moreover,] were the amendment ever to be adopted into the armory of natural law,
one would have expected it to have occurred in such classic connections as the opin-
ion of Chase, J., in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), or in the argument of
former Justice Campbell in Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), or
in the opinion of Miller, J., in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
But it does not, not even when Mr. Justice Miller in the later case speaks of "Implied
reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist,
and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name." Id. at 663.
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foundation in Lockean political theory requires an understanding of
those actuating notions.
Writing as rough contemporaries in the seventeenth century, John
Locke and Thomas Hobbes found different answers to a common prob-
lem. Hobbes, the defender of absolute sovereign power, regarded
humans as uniformly selfish in a world without external authority to re-
strain their passions. Accordingly, life in this condition was "solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish and short."' 50 To escape this gloomy fate and to
acquire security and order, Hobbes would exact a price consisting of the
surrender of liberty and property to an absolute sovereign. While the
individuals in this Hobbesian social contract would be somewhat better
off, the big winner from this exchange would no doubt be the sovereign.
Being a legal monopolist, the sovereign would exact monopoly rents-
most of the benefits of political union would be expropriated by and for
the sovereign.
Locke, by contrast, sought to devise a set of institutional arrange-
ments which would allow individuals to escape the perils of social disor-
der without having to surrender their entire stock of individual rights.
His goal was to vest the individuals composing the society with all the
benefits created by political union. Locke's sovereign was to be prevented
from expropriating the benefits of the social contract. To accomplish
this, Locke posited that the sovereign merely succeeded to the private
rights given up to it by the contracting individual members of society.
Thus, the state itself had no claim to new and independent rights as
against the persons under its control. As a modern commentator has put
it: "The state can acquire nothing by simple declaration of its will but
must justify its claims in terms of the rights of the individuals whom it
protects."'' I Of course, since "the central purpose of government is to
maintain peace and order within the territory, ' 52 the Lockean sovereign
succeeds to private rights of self-defense in order to curb illegitimate,
power-based intrusions upon the rights of others.53 This police power
Dunbar, supra note 5, at 640 n.47; see also Caplan, supra note 2, at 261 n.158. It is possible, as
Dunbar indicates, that these cases did not recognize the ninth amendment as a repository of
natural law because they involved state, rather than federal, action.
50. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 13 (1651).
51. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 12 (1985).
52. I1d. at 16.
53. An apt illustration of this principle is to be seen in the interplay of the law relative to
possession of and trespass upon real property. At early common law, the essence of possession
was the legal concept of the right of "seisin," a term connoting "peace and quiet." 2 F. POL-
LOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I,
at 29-30 (2d ed. 1959). To vindicate this right, the law of trespass was created. Since allowing
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attribute of sovereignty insures that the state can effectively provide
peace and order to the individual members of the society but, critically,
the power's theoretical outer limits are the limits of self-defense in private
hands. The state cannot prohibit what could not legitimately be resisted
or prohibited by private action prior to the Lockean compact.
Lockean thought was the dominant political theory at the time of
the Constitution's adoption.5 4 Constitutional limitations upon the fed-
eral government's power and express diffusion of its exercise were in-
tended to guarantee the liberties of the individuals forming the society by
dividing the potential power of the state to seize those liberties for it-
self.5 5 The Constitution specifies precise measures to divide and check
the exercise of power but is generally silent about protection of individual
substantive rights. The elaborate devices created to limit power were, of
course, intended to serve some substantive end. The procedural safe-
guards in the original Constitution implicitly protected against encroach-
ments upon individual entitlements. It was for this reason that Hamilton
and Wilson opposed adoption of the Bill of Rights.56 With this concep-
tual understanding it is possible to see the function to be discharged by
the Bill of Rights. It "identifies the ends of government, the rights that
the system of limited jurisdiction, indirect voting, and separation of
power is designed to protect.157 It is this theoretical substantive end
which the ninth amendment was intended to serve that must be kept in
mind when examining its specific content.
Construing the ninth amendment as a mere declaration of a consti-
tutional truism, devoid of enforceable content, renders its substance nu-
gatory and assigns to its framers an intention to engage in a purely moot
exercise. This view is at odds with the contextual historical evidence 8
"men to make forcible entries on land ... is to invite violence," the trespass laws' protection of
possession "is a prohibition of self-help in the interest of public order." Id. at 31, 41.
54. Not only did Blackstone adopt the Lockean theory of the state, see supra note 46, but
the constitutional framework of limited and separated powers provides evidence of intent to
disable the sovereign from seizing the benefits of political union. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note
51, at 16; Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt. 2), 42
HARV. L. REV. 365, 394-409 (1929).
55. Locke desired a separation of executive and legislative functions. J. LOCKE, supra
note 46, §§ 143-144, at 382-83. Montesquieu is generally credited with the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. 1 C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 11, at 149-51 (1748).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
57. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 51, at 18.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 8-24. Too much cannot be made of the public
opposition to the Constitution's adoption. It was this opposition, which viewed the central
government as "foreign," that compelled the first Congress to propose the Bill of Rights. See,
e.g., Elbridge Gerry's assertion in Congress:
[A] great body of our constituents opposed the Constitution as it now stands ....
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and the specific, articulated concerns of its framers, 59 and violates the
premise of Marbury v. Madison that the Constitution contains judicially
discoverable and enforceable principles.60
If the ninth amendment merely declares certain areas to be off limits
for the exercise of the federal government's power, by what mechanism is
that government to be prevented from ignoring its constitutionally de-
fined boundaries? Berger contends that ninth amendment rights are not
judicially enforceable because they do not arise under the Constitution
but find their source wholly outside the Constitution. 61 This conclusion
is premised, in part, upon the language chosen by Madison for introduc-
ing the ninth amendment in the House of Representatives. 62 Madison
asserted that if the Bill of Rights were
incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights; they will be an inpenetrable bulwark against every assumption
of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to
resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
constitution by the declaration of rights.63
Berger contends that Madison's assertion, coupled with his belief
that constitutional opponents were motivated in their opposition by the
absence in the Constitution of "effectual provisions against encroach-
ments on particular rights," 64 is a sure indicator that only the specified
[and] are apprehensive of the enormous power of [the federal] Government.... The
ratification of the Constitution in several states would never have taken place had
they not been assured that the objections would be duly attended to by Congress.
I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 446-47; see also supra note 18.
59. The draftsmen of the ninth amendment knew what they were about: limiting the
delegated powers of the federal government.
This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people against the mal-
administration of the [new central] government.
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 749 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry). Even the nationalist
Madison admitted that "the abuse of powers of the General Government may be guarded
against in a more secure manner than is now done [by the unamended Constitution]." Id. at
449-50.
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166-67, 177-78 (1803); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 20-
23 (Constitution contains principles enforceable through judicial review); H. WECHSLER,
PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 4-10 (1961) (contending that Constitution's
status as supreme law demands that it contain discoverable, enforceable values); Scharpf, Judi-
cial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 517-19
(1966); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-29 (sur-
veying arguments advanced by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury for judicial review).
61. Berger, supra note 2, at 9.
62. Id. at 8; see supra text accompanying note 26.
63. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 440.
64. Id. at 433.
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rights were to be judicially enforced.65 Rights were enumerated solely to
make them susceptible of judicial enforcement. The inevitable corollary
conclusion to this proposition is that ninth amendment rights, whatever
their substance, are not capable of judicial enforcement. As a practical
matter, then, they may be freely invaded by a Congress vigorously exer-
cising its express or implied powers. 66 This conclusion meets an immedi-
ate and formidable obstacle in the language of the ninth amendment
itself. If the reserved rights are not to be denied or disparaged by the
enumeration of other rights, but only the enumerated rights may be judi-
cially enforced, the reserved rights necessarily shrivel. If this is not dis-
paragement, or "impairment" as Elbridge Gerry would have preferred, 67
then the concept has been drained of all meaning.
Moreover, Berger makes too much of "Madison's disclaimer of in-
tention 'to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution' by
nonenumeration of 'other rights.' "68 Madison's fourth resolution sets
forth a rule of construction that enumeration of rights should "not be
construed as to ... enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for
greater caution."'69 Madison's language readily supports the conclusion
that the ninth amendment cannot be used as a springboard for enabling
Congress, under Article I, section 8,70 to create additional rights.71 But
65. Berger, supra note 2, at 8-9; cf. Dunbar, supra note 5, at 643 (judicial enforcement is
the practical effect of enumeration; ninth amendment rights are defendable only through polit-
ical action).
66. When the rule of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the
supremacy clause, the post-1937 expansion of the commerce clause, and the attenuation of the
tenth amendment are read together, an interpretation of the ninth amendment which denies
judicial enforcement of those rights "retained by the people" is the amendment's death sen-
tence. That, perhaps, is the logical extension of the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence in
a direction which dismisses federalism as an antiquarian relic to be discarded for lack of mod-
em relevance. A comprehensive treatment of federalism, setting forth a modem federal the-
ory, is beyond the scope of this article. For ninth amendment rights to have real flesh, whether
one subscribes to Berger's view of enforceability or to the view set forth in the text accompany-
ing note 58 above to note 74 below, may require a radical change of thought in constitutional
interpretation concerning the proper scope of the powers of Congress, at least with respect to
the states.
67. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 754.
68. Berger, supra note 2, at 8; see also supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
69. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 435.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 enumerates the powers delegated to Congress and concludes
with a grant of power to Congress
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
71. Both Berger, a principal advocate of a limited, declaratory reading of the ninth
amendment, and Ely, an activist egalitarian, agree on this point. Berger, supra note 2, at 8-10;
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delegated powers are not enlarged by treating the ninth amendment's
declaration of reserved rights to be, itself, a constitutional right. The
amendment is, after all, a part of the Constitution and declares its pur-
pose to be to prevent denial or disparagement of its unspecified rights. It
would be richly ironic to find this piece of the constitutional text unde-
serving of judicial protection, for it would declare the principle that the
rights thereby reserved were simply reserved for oblivion whenever the
federal government chose to eradicate or ignore them.72 Rather, pro-
ceeding from the familiar maxim, "for every wrong there is a remedy, '73
it would seem logical to assume the existence of some enforceable remedy
whenever the federal government exceeds its delegated powers by invad-
ing a reserved right. This remedy, of course, can have meaning only to
the extent that the ninth amendment has substantive sources or content
discernible by principled means of interpretation not reliant upon the im-
portation of wholly subjective values.74
In drafting the ninth amendment, surely its authors had in mind
some bundle of rights worthy of constitutional protection. Perhaps the
surest indication of the kind of rights with which they were concerned
lies in the fact that the ninth amendment was proposed, considered, and
adopted as a part of the Bill of Rights.75 This was no accident; it was the
logical product of a century and a half of colonial government. From the
J. ELY, supra note 2, at 37. Madison's disclaimer, coupled with the explicit text of the neces-
sary and proper clause, disposes of any such notion.
72. By inference, Caplan would seem to adopt this topsy-turvy view. He contends that
the ninth amendment merely perpetuates any individual rights rooted in state law until "elimi-
nated ... by federal preemption." Caplan, supra note 2, at 228. Caplan relies on the
supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, for this conclusion.
Of course, there are constitutional guarantees that escape judicial review by application of
the murky doctrine of nonjusticiability. See, eg., the guarantee clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4, cl. 1 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government.... ."). Since Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), the guarantee
clause has been consigued to this constitutional purgatory. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, § 3-16.
But see Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee Clause,
93 YALE L.J. 561 (1984); infra text accompanying notes 118-25; see also Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160, 168-70 (1948) (refusal to determine the duration of a state of war); Clark v.
Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 514 (1947) (refusal to determine whether treaty abrogated); Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (refusal to determine whether a state has properly ratified a consti-
tutional amendment). It is possible that the tenth amendment has also slipped into this nether
world. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3523 (West 1984). Maxims ofjurisprudence and rules of statutory
construction are not inapplicable when wrestling with constitutional meaning. See Berger,
"Government by Judiciary" Judge Gibbons' Argument Ad Hominem, 59 B.U.L. REV. 783,
804-06 (1977) (citing eminent jurists and commentators who believe such canons to be applica-
ble to constitutional interpretation).
74. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
75. Divining meaning from constitutional text by its context and from structurally re-
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beginning of English settlement in North America, colonists believed
themselves the equals of native Englishmen and entitled to the "rights of
Englishmen" as established by English statutory and common law. 76 The
colonists did not believe these were static rights but asserted them to be
capable of limitation, amplification, or revision by their colonial legisla-
tures.77 Moreover, they did not wholly trust the English statutory enact-
ments, preferring to enact existing guarantees as part of colonial organic
law. 78 Accordingly, during the Virginia ratification debates, Patrick
Henry declared that George Mason's 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights
"secures the great and principal rights of mankind," such "rights of the
people" being those secured by English and American statutory law and
the common law of England as imported to America. 79 A federal Bill of
Rights, then, was a plain statement of these great and principal rights of
mankind. It was not an exhaustive list; the ninth amendment reminds us
of this fact.
Since the source of the first eight amendments was the inherited
"rights of Englishmen" as adapted to colonial circumstances and secured
by state charters and statutes, it would seem a safe point of departure to
assume that the unenumerated rights of the ninth amendment were in-
tended to be the remaining such "rights of Englishmen." But, of course,
after successful revolt from British rule, Americans possessed only rights
of Americans. To be sure, the rights of Americans might have a source
in the traditional fount of common law but, to the extent such rights
lated constitutional concepts is at the heart of Professor Black's thesis. See C. BLACK, supra
note 29, at 3-32.
76. T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 64, 66 (1986); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *63-64, *104-05, *123-24. Among the important statutory sources of the "rights of
Englishmen" were the Magna Carta (1215), Petition of Rights (1628), Habeas Corpus Act
(1679), Declaration of Rights (1689), Toleration Act (1689), Mutiny Act (1689), and Settle-
ment Act (1701). See generally F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLEC-
TUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 9-55 (1985); H. TAYLOR, THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 230-43 (1911).
77. See, e.g., Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 1686 (F. Thorpe
ed. 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
78. The Magna Carta established that personal liberty and private rights to property were
beyond the royal grasp and could be taken only as provided by the law of the land. This early
statement of due process had been confirmed by Parliament in 1773. Cf 1 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *137-38. (Since Blackstone's first edition was published in 1765, it contains
no reference to the 1773 statutory enactment. Later editions contain the reference. See, eg.,
id. at *139-40 (J. Chitty ed. 1826).) It had also been incorporated into Maryland law (1639),
Massachusetts' Body of Liberties (1641), the West New Jersey Charter (1676), New York's
"Charter of Libertyes and Privilidges" (1683), and even the Northwest Ordinance (1787). 5
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 77, at 2549.
79. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 461, 513, 587-88.
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were of statutory dimension, the relevant statutes were those enacted by
the states.80 Indeed, the sentiment of many of the framers was to look to
the states as the source of protection of their cherished liberties.81 It was
this source that was drawn upon to compose a federal Bill of Rights.
This stream of rights had two branches. The framers understood
and observed a distinction between "natural" rights and "civil" or "posi-
tive" rights.8 2 Positive rights had their source in state common, constitu-
tional, and statutory law; natural rights stemmed from Lockean notions
concerning the "unalienable" ' 3 rights of the people. But, because both
forms were considered to be "essential to secure the liberty of the peo-
ple,"' 84 the package of rights expressly enumerated in the first eight
amendments contains both natural and positive rights.8 5 It is a fair infer-
ence, then, that the unenumerated rights of the ninth amendment were
thought to consist of both varieties. If this be so, the distinction between
"natural" and "positive" rights cannot account for the selection of the
rights worthy of enumeration in the first eight amendments. Some other
rationale must be supplied for the specification of those rights, else we
reach the unlikely conclusion that the thoughtful, learned framers were
actuated by caprice.
The framers enumerated certain rights for a purpose other than in-
80. Caplan makes a persuasive case that the ninth amendment was intended only to pre-
serve from federal encroachment rights secured by state law. See Caplan, supra note 2, at 228-
59. He concludes that "the ninth amendment embraces those individual liberties protected by
state laws." Id. at 265.
81. Oliver Ellsworth, for example, trusted "for the preservation of his rights to the State
Govts. From these alone he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life." I THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 492 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter
RECORDS]. In recommending against inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution,
Roger Sherman declared: "The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitu-
tion; and being in force are sufficient." 2 id. at 588. James Wilson asserted in 1791 that "our
(colonial] assemblies were chosen by ourselves: they were the guardians of our rights, the
objects of our confidence, and the anchor of our political hopes." I WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
292 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
82. Madison perceived a distinction between natural rights, "those rights which are re-
tained when particular powers are given up to be exercised by the Legislature," and positive
rights, those which "may seem to result from the nature of the compact." I ANNALS OF
CONG., supra note 20, at 954; see supra note 47. This distinction was also seen by Blackstone.
I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *42-44, *121-22. Indeed its roots can be traced to Aristotle.
See Caplan, supra note 2, at 237 n.55.
83. See I THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 349 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971);
The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these Truths to be self-evi-
dent, that all Men are ... endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights ....
84. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 454 (Madison's remarks).
85. See supra note 47. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedom of speech, a natural
right) with U.S. CONST. amend. VII (trial by jury, a positive right).
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suring their judicial enforceability. 86 Madison observed, when introduc-
ing the Bill of Rights in Congress, that it was necessary to enumerate
certain rights of the people because some states had no bill of rights and
other states' declarations were defective. 87 Moreover, Madison was un-
willing to rely on natural law as wholly preservative of the peoples'
liberties:
It would be a sufficient answer to say, that this objection lies against
such provisions [declarations of rights] under the State Governments,
as well as under the General Government; and there are, I believe, but
few gentlemen who are inclined to push their theory so far as to say
that a declaration of rights in those cases is either ineffectual or
improper. 88
Rights were enumerated in the federal Constitution to provide a clear
barrier to federal action;89 the specific guarantees selected for enumera-
tion were derived from similar specific guarantees then in existence under
state charters, constitutions, or declarations of rights.90 The inclusion of
the ninth amendment was, in part, an attempt to be certain that rights
protected by state law were not supplanted by federal law simply because
they were not enumerated.91 But the ninth amendment was intended to
do more than secure unenumerated state-based rights from federal inva-
sion; it was also to serve as a barrier to encroachment upon natural rights
retained by the people.92
Thus, the ninth amendment protects two distinct categories of
rights: positive rights, having their source in state law, and natural
86. Madison undoubtedly thought enumeration would lead to judicial enforceability. See
supra text accompanying notes 62-63. Yet, he also entertained larger hopes for the entire Bill
of Rights. "The political truths declared in that solemn manner acquire by degrees the charac-
ter of fundamental maxims of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the
national sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion." 5 MADISON WRITINGS,
supra note 11, at 273. One of those political truths for which Madison held such high hopes
was that unenumerated rights retained by the people were of equal constitutional dignity with
the specified rights.
87. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at452; see also infra text accompanying note
121.
88. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 455.
89. See supra note 59.
90. See supra note 87 & infra note 121.
91. See Caplan, supra note 2, at 254.
92. Madison feared that enumeration of rights "would disparage those rights which were
not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow, by implication, that those rights which
were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government,
and were consequently insecure." 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 456. This inference
could be "guarded against" by the ninth amendment. Id. The fact that Madison had the same
fear with respect to state bills of rights indicates that he appreciated that certain rights were
"natural [and] ... retained by the people," 5 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 11, at 390 & n.1,
and were properly beyond the powers of government.
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rights, grounded in conceptions of inalienable rights of man.93 The dif-
ference compels differing analytical treatment of their content and en-
forceability. If the reserved positive rights of the ninth amendment may
be determined by reference to state law, either existing in 1788 or later
created, there is no genuine theoretical obstacle to their judicial enforce-
ment. Concern that the substance of these rights is so amorphous as to
endanger the validity of the judicial process by license to import subjec-
tive personal values is eliminated by looking only to state law to provide
the boundaries of reserved positive rights. Unfortunately, judicial en-
forcement of reserved natural rights implicates precisely these
concerns.
94
IV. Positive Rights
Application of state law positive rights, secured by the ninth amend-
ment, as a barrier to action by the federal government poses substantial
apparent conflict with the supremacy clause.95 However, once it is con-
ceded that the state-based rights guaranteed by the ninth amendment are
federal rights, the conflict partially vanishes, for the rights preserved are
federal in character though state in origin. This starting point finds sup-
port in the amendment's text, which enjoins a construction of the Consti-
tution that would "deny or disparage" the unenumerated rights. To
conclude that ninth amendment rights are capable of invasion by means
of the supremacy clause96 is to both deny and disparage them, for no one
contends that the rights secured by the first eight amendments may be
preempted by simple congressional action.97
93. This division is wholly consistent with Madison's conception of rights as procedural,
or positive, and substantive, or natural. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
95. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Supremacy clause problems are confined to evaluation of ninth
amendment positive rights. Since the source of natural rights lies in conceptions of inalienable
rights of the people not transferable to government upon making the social compact, such
rights do not present any state challenge to federal authority. See supra text accompanying
notes 30-31 & 54-55; infra notes 128-32.
96. See supra notes 7 & 72.
97. This is the fundamental error of Justice Reed in United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947); see supra note 7. By assuming that the ninth amendment can be
invaded by congressional action and that the first eight amendments cannot, Justice Reed
made a distinction fatally disparaging to ninth amendment rights. Unless its text be ignored,
the ninth amendment forbids the distinction.
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Even though ninth amendment positive rights are federal in charac-
ter, their state origin poses practical problems in finding a comfortable fit
between the supremacy clause and the ninth amendment. Two extreme
alternatives may be quickly dismissed. First, Congress could be con-
ceded the power to preempt a state-based ninth amendment right. As
discussed above, this conclusion repudiates the amendment's text and ig-
nores whatever effect the later amendment may have been intended to
have on the earlier supremacy clause. Second, Congress could be denied
any power to preempt a state-based ninth amendment right under any
circumstances. While this conclusion would elevate ninth amendment
rights to equal status with the enumerated rights, a result commanded by
the amendment itself, it raises an ugly specter of back-door nullification.
If congressional action can be effective only if the states implicitly con-
sent by their failure to enact contrary legislation (which would provide a
source for the federal rights reserved by the ninth amendment) the ghost
of John C. Calhoun has arisen in a new and powerful form.98 This would
be a disturbing and radical result at odds with much of American history
and the settled understanding of the proper place of the states and
Congress.
Can there be any rationally explicable middle ground? The funda-
mental problem is to differentiate among state rights in a way that does
not "deny or disparage" ninth amendment rights. The understanding of
the ninth amendment's framers provides a helpful departure for formula-
tion of a usable standard. The framers were unwilling to declare in the
Constitution that common law, or even state law, remained in effect be-
cause they thought that to do so would freeze the common law at the
date of its adoption, thereby preventing that highly organic mechanism
from undergoing further change. 99 Rufus King also thought that consti-
tutional guarantees of state law would prevent the states from later alter-
ing their laws. 1°° The common law was in an anomalous position: it was
98. Calhoun, of course, as Vice-President in Andrew Jackson's first term, originated the
doctrine of nullification in response to the Tariff of 1828. He asserted the constitutional right
of a state to void federal law within its own borders whenever the state independently deter-
mined such law to be unconstitutional. Following enactment of the Tariff of 1832, South
Carolina's enthusiastic adoption of nullification with respect to application of the tariff in
South Carolina threatened the continued existence of the Union. See generally R. REMINI,
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN FREEDOM, 1822-1832, at 137, 160, 232-
37, 381, 387-89 (1981); R. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE COURSE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY, 1833-1845, at 8-44 (1984).
99. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 450-51 (G. Nicholas, Virginia), 469-70 (E. Randolph,
Virginia).
100. In the Massachusetts ratification convention, King declared that "if the present con-
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"not excluded"101 but neither was it "understood to be a law of the
United States."10 2 It was not expressly adopted, for to do so would
mummify it in place; it was not excluded because, when all was said and
done, it was still a source of the "great and principal rights of man-
kind."10 3 Clearly, the framers intended to permit the later evolution of
common and statutory law within the several states. Simultaneously, in
adopting the ninth amendment, they preserved the constitutionally guar-
anteed dignity of personal rights which have their source in such state
laws. 104
Two principles then suggest themselves as possible alternative vehi-
cles for sorting out the claims of a state-based ninth amendment right
when they conflict with otherwise legitimate federal legislative action.
First, if the asserted federal ninth amendment right is predicated upon
state action taken prior to the Constitution's adoption,10 5 the claimed
ninth amendment right is secured against congressional invasion. This
conclusion finds support in the general fear of federal encroachment that
prompted adoption of the ninth amendment-not all of the great and
principal rights of man were specified in the first eight amendments; fail-
ure to preserve inviolate the unspecified rights would hazard them to loss
by action of an aggressive central government.10 6 If the ninth amend-
ment was to preserve against federal action unspecified rights whose
source was in state constitutional, common, or statutory law it is readily
inferable that the framers intended thereby to displace the federal pre-
emptive power, at least with respect to ninth amendment rights which
could be identified by reference to then existing state sources.
A second, and more radical, alternative is to conclude that the fram-
ers intended to permit the states to continue to develop sources of ninth
amendment rights after the Constitution's adoption. To reconcile this
conclusion with the supremacy clause it is necessary to assume that, from
the clean slate of constitutional adoption, both the federal Congress and
the states possessed concurrent authority to modify personal positive
stitution of this state had been guarantied by the United States..., it must have precluded the
state from making any alteration in it, should [Massachusetts] see fit so to do." 2 id. at 101.
101. 3 id. at 451 (G. Nicholas).
102. 4 id. at 565 (J. Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions).
103. 3 id. at 461 (P. Henry); see supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
104. In evaluating the proposed Constitution during the Philadelphia convention, George
Mason concluded that "[t]he laws of the U.S. are to be paramount to State Bills of Rights." 2
RECORDS, supra note 81, at 588. For this, among other reasons, Mason opposed the Constitu-
tion's ratification by Virginia and, once adoption became inevitable, urged the adoption of a
federal Bill of Rights.
105. July 2, 1788. 1 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 332.
106. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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rights.10 7 To be sure, congressional authority is limited to its delegated
powers; state authority is limited by constitutional prohibitions, includ-
ing the supremacy clause. A principle of priority in time then suggests
itself as a vehicle for sorting out the conflicting claims of a state-based
ninth amendment right and otherwise legitimate federal legislative ac-
tion. If the state-law source of the asserted federal ninth amendment
right predates the congressional action which would invade the fight, the
congressional action must yield. If the contrary condition exists, Con-
gress will be deemed to have preempted the field. Such an approach al-
lows for the natural development of democratic institutions in the twin
arenas of the Capitol and the state houses. When the people, through
their spokespersons, declare a right to be of sufficient importance to be
worthy of legal articulation, it becomes preserved through the ninth
amendment. But if the right is merely quiescent, and Congress has exer-
cised otherwise legitimate authority to regulate state and personal behav-
ior in a way which would preclude exercise of the inchoate right, it is
waived until and unless the federal democracy changes its legislative de-
termination. This proposal may be more nearly consistent with the fram-
ers' desire to ensure the continued evolution of state common law10 8 but
poses enormous practical problems that, in all likelihood, doom it as a
seriously workable constitutional mechanism.109
Limiting ninth amendment positive rights to those having a clear
107. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) (concluding that concurrent jurisdiction
exists with respect to personal positive rights); Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S. 178, 188 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (federal rights may be vindicated in a state forum unless Congress
has conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon federal courts).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
109. The foremost problem is the difficulty of establishing priority of action between Con-
gress and the several states. Perhaps some rights are of dubious ancestry; rules governing bur-
den of proof could dispose of these questionable claims. Later-admitted states would object
that reckoning their citizens' rights by dates of admission to the Union contradicts the princi-
ple of equal status of the states. This problem could be avoided by permitting a later-admitted
state to assert the priority of earlier states if it has vested its citizens with a reserved ninth
amendment right in existence, by reference to sister state sources, prior to its own admission.
A cottage industry of legal historians would spring up, bringing greater expense to litigants but
providing the valuable benefits of enhanced public understanding of the roots of assumed liber-
ties.
Perhaps most nettlesome would be the issue of the uniform (or nonuniform) character of
this federal ninth amendment right. Since it derives its content from state sources, it is logical
to view the federal right as one varying in content with the state citizenship of the claimant.
For example, a Californian possesses a state constitutional right to privacy. CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 1 (1849, amended 1972). Assuming, hypothetically, the absence of a federal constitutional
right of privacy, should a Californian be able to assert a federal right not available to an
Alabaman? By contrast, what good reason demands that an Alabaman be able to assert a
federal right that owes its existence to timely action by the citizens of California? The practi-
cal problems thus illustrated reveal this alternative to be hopelessly unworkable.
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textual foundation in state sources in existence at the time of the Consti-
tution's adoption avoids the mischief inherent in splitting supremacy
clause hairs. Moreover, it permits the asserted ninth amendment right to
be uniform in character, a result unlikely to be achieved were the "prior-
ity in time" alternative adopted. Since, under this proposal, a federal
ninth amendment positive right finds its substance in state action prior to
1788, its boundaries are defined by the pre-1788 organic law of all of the
original states, taken together. A ninth amendment right thus derived is
identical for all citizens, whatever their state citizenship, and operates to
block federal action invasive of this right.
Commentators agree that the ninth amendment operates, if at all,
against federal action. 110 Disagreement begins when attempts are made
to apply the amendment as a barrier to state action."' Most such at-
tempts have utilized the incorporation doctrine, by which specific guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights have been held applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.112 Superficially, it would appear that
it is not "logically possible to 'incorporate' the ninth amendment through
the fourteenth to apply as a prohibition against the states, because the
ninth amendment was designed not to circumscribe but to protect the
enactments of the states."11 3 But if one considers that the federal charac-
ter of ninth amendment positive rights derives from state action, applica-
tion of the ninth amendment to the states would merely amount to a
federally enforced right to make the states abide by their own law. For a
government to abide by its own law is of the essence of due process.114
110. J. ELY, supra note 2; Berger, supra note 2.
111. Compare Berger, supra note 2, at 23-24 and Caplan, supra note 2, at 264 with Red-
lich, Are There "Certain Rights ... Retained by the People?" 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 787, 806
(1962) (suggesting application of ninth amendment to states through fourteenth amendment)
and C. BLACK, supra note 2; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1981)
(Goldberg, J., concurring):
[Tihe Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties are specifically men-
tioned in the first eight amendments, is surely relevant in showing the existence of
other fundamental personal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal, in-
fringement. In sum, the Ninth Amendment simply lends strong support to the view
that the "liberty" protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from infringe-
ment by the Federal Government or the States is not restricted to rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments.
112. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14 (1967); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
113. Caplan, supra note 2, at 261-62 (footnote omitted).
114. "The words 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same
meaning as the words 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Charta." Murray's Lessee v. Hobo-
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Since the fourteenth amendment demands that states not "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,""I5 it is no
grotesque distortion of either the ninth or fourteenth amendments to
read into them a requirement that a state observe its own law." 6 More-
over, this result is highly compatible with Madison's observation that
positive rights secured by the Bill of Rights are procedural in nature.1 17
However, if incorporation is deemed undesirable, a state may still be
required to enforce its own law through the guarantee clause. 118 This
approach would require a substantial modification in the accepted under-
standing of that clause. Since Luther v. Borden 119 the guarantee clause
has evaded judicial review because it has been consigned to the nether
world of nonjusticiability. But reading the clause as a federal constitu-
tional guarantee "that the states either observe their own constitutions
and laws or change them by legally valid procedures"' 120 is a peculiarly
well-suited vehicle for enforcing state compliance with the state laws
which form the content of ninth amendment positive rights. When intro-
ducing the Bill of Rights, Madison explained its necessity, in part, by
observing that "some states have no bills of rights," and those that did
had failed to secure rights to "the full extent which republican principles
ken Land & Improvement Co., 9 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855) (citing 2 E. CoKE, INSTI-
TuTES *45, *50); see also Corwin, supra note 54, at 378.
115. U.S. CONSr. amend XIV, § 1.
116. In order to give full effect to such a guarantee it would be helpful to discard the
current erroneous understanding of the eleventh amendment, which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The current doctrine, based on Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890),
holds that a citizen may not sue his own state directly in federal court, Employees v. Missouri
Pub. Health & Welfare Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), nor even invoke federal jurisdiction to
compel his own state to observe its own law. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984). The current doctrine proceeds from the mistaken assumption that the
eleventh amendment was intended to constitutionalize state sovereign immunity as a result of
the profound "shock of surprise" created by Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),
which held Georgia amenable to suit by a South Carolina creditor. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11. The
doctrine ignores the plain language of the eleventh amendment, the history of its adoption, and
the century of judicial interpretation of its text prior to the 1890 Hans decision. See generally
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); Massey, The
Pennhurst Decision: Ignoring the History of the 11th Amendment, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 5, 1984,
at 13.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
118. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government.. . ." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1.
119. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
120. Note, supra note 72, at 561.
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would require."121 This contemporaneous expression is a plain indica-
tion that both the specific and unenumerated rights which compose the
Bill of Rights form part of the core understanding of the meaning of
republican government. Moreover, conformity to law is at the heart of
any conception of republican government. 122 This reading of the guaran-
tee clause modifies but in no way distorts the established conception of
the clause,123 helps effectuate the ninth amendment without damaging
other constitutional values, 124 and conforms to the constitutional duty to
decide cases and controversies. 125
V. Natural Rights
Since the "great and principal rights of mankind" 126 protected by
the ninth amendment include both positive and natural rights, it is neces-
sary to confront the amorphous goblin of natural law in order to define
natural ninth amendment rights without reference to sources wholly ex-
trinsic to the Constitution. 127 Madison's contention that "natural rights
[are] retained"12 8 by the people is consistent with the theory that natural
rights find their source in the immutable, inalienable rights of mankind,
possessed apart from and transcendent to government. 129 It is the tran-
121. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 20, at 452.
122. See the authorities collected in Note, supra note 72, at 566 n.34.
123. Id. at 565-73.
124. Cf C. BLACK, supra note 29, at 33-51 (constitutional interpretation should take place
within whole context of legal and political structures created by the Constitution).
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
126. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 461 (Patrick Henry).
127. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
128. 5 MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 11, at 389 n.l.
129. W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 117-27 (5th ed. 1967). That this notion was cen-
tral to the framers' intellectual understanding of their government can be seen from the Decla-
ration of Independence, which echoed earlier colonial declarations of rights:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776). At the Constitutional Convention,
Madison observed that the people are "the fountain of all power." 2 RECORDS, supra note 81,
at 476. Edmund Pendleton echoed Madison during the Virginia ratification convention: "Who
but the people have a right to form government?" 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 37. As early
as 1775, Alexander Hamilton proclaimed his allegiance to natural law principles. I THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 61-64, 87 (H. Lodge ed. 1904). Indeed, Hamilton went so
far as to proclaim:
The Sacred Rights of Mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or
musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human
nature, by the hand of the Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by
mortal power.
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scendent authority of these rights that makes them important to con-
front; it is their gossamer nature that makes them virtually impossible to
discern by application of neutral principles. If they be paramount to leg-
islative action, it is no accident that.the framers selected the phrase "re-
tained by the people" 130 to describe these rights. Positive rights acquired
substance by the social compact; hence their retention by the people was
ceded to the government as part of the initial governmental contract.131
Natural rights could not, by definition, be so ceded. Hence it is logically
anomalous to conclude that the people's assertion of a retained natural
right against state action infringing that right is not proper.132
The hard task is finding principled substance in these natural rights.
When it is recalled that the objective in erecting a constitutional barrier
to the denial of retained, unenumerated rights was to preserve the great
and principal rights of man, it becomes apparent that it is possible to
borrow from existing constitutional theory to put flesh on these skeletal
rights. The doctrine of fundamental rights, long a part of equal protec-
tion analysis, 133 seems most conceptually akin to Patrick Henry's great
and principal rights. 134 Moreover, to be consistent with Lockean polit-
ical theory, such fundamental rights must be seen to be precisely cotermi-
nous with private rights not subject to invasion by legitimate private
action. Yet, for purposes of finding those paramount fundamental rights
protected by the ninth amendment against state or federal invasion, some
limiting principles are prudent. An asserted fundamental right should
Id. at 113; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819).
130. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
131. See supra notes 47 & 82.
132. This conclusion encounters difficulty when it is recalled that the enumerated rights
(among them some natural rights) were not originally intended to be enforceable against the
states: "Had congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions
of the several states by affording the people additional protection from the exercise of power by
their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have de-
clared this purpose in plain and intelligible language." Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). Establishment of the incorporation doctrine as a fixture of constitu-
tional law removes most of these difficulties. Incorporation implicitly recognizes that the para-
mount nature of the enumerated rights overrides state attempts to rescind their guarantees.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); cf Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1885).
134. Natural law is long-established in American law. See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note
129, at 136-51; see also supra notes 46 & 49-57 and accompanying text; infra notes 198-99. If
fundamental rights have any philosophical foundation, it is upon the rock of natural law which
has actuated so much of American legal thought. See supra note 129; Corwin, supra note 32, at
152; Corwin, The Debt of American Constitutional Law to Natural Law Concepts, 25 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 258 (1950).
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have textual foundation in the Constitution, however implicit or attenu-
ated. 135 It should have some historical authenticity in the organic law of
the nation, the states, the colonies, or the common law. It should be
consistent with the theoretical construct of natural rights, so far as that
subject can provide meaning. 136 It should be a right generally recognized
by a significant portion of contemporary society as one inextricably con-
nected with the inherent dignity of the individual. 137
A. The Right of Privacy
The right of privacy, particularly as manifested in intimate choices
regarding marital sex and procreation, is the constitutional right most
closely associated with the ninth amendment.1 38 Where, if at all, does
this right fit analytically into the constitutional template constructed thus
far? First, privacy would not seem to be a positive or civil right. It is not
manufactured by operation of the social compact, as Madison thought of
the right to trial by jury.1 39 That is, in parting with unfettered personal
autonomy in order to create government, a right of privacy was not
thereby created as a regulation upon the procedural action of the com-
munity. Rather, a substantive right of privacy would seem to exist inde-
pendently of the acts of civil authorities. A right of privacy is thus at
least consistent with the theoretical understanding of natural rights,
although justifying a right of privacy as a ninth amendment right solely
by reference to natural law theory is tautological. Fortunately, there are
more secure anchors. Privacy has historical authenticity. Its roots may
be traced back from Griswold to Olmstead v. United States 140 to the nine-
135. In this connection, the utility of finding constitutional meaning in "structure and
relationship" is germane. See C. BLACK, supra note 29. This limitation is plainly not required
by the ninth amendment, which indeed would seemingly preclude reliance upon textual foun-
dations other than the amendment itself. The proposed limitation is prudential only, intended
to limit judicial resort to personal values and subjective preferences. See supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text.
136. At the very least, an asserted fundamental right ought to be plainly inferable from the
analytical arguments advanced by natural law scholars.
137. No suggestion is made that an asserted right must command a majority. Given the
anti-majoritarian nature of judicial review, this is unlikely. Rather, the right, even if highly
controversial, should be recognized to exist in concepts of inherent human dignity. A contem-
porary paradigmatic example is the asserted right of a woman to freely terminate her
pregnancy.
138. No doubt this association is primarily due to Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); infra text accompanying notes 145-62.
139. See supra notes 47 & 82.
140. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Caplan, supra note 2, at 266
n. 176.
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teenth-century torts commentator, Judge Cooley, who described the
right as the "right to be let alone." 141 Cooley, in turn, in all likelihood
distilled the right from the package of fundamental personal rights con-
ceived by Blackstone to consist of the inviolate nature of the person' 42
and recognized by the Anglo-American adage, "a man's home is his
castle." 143
Privacy also has a textual foundation in the Constitution. The first
amendment secures basic freedoms of thought, expression, and associa-
tion; the third and fourth preserve inviolate the individual home and per-
son. While this textual warrant is concededly attenuated, it is safe to
derive from the context and intent of these enumerated rights a concern
that individuals, in their homes and with respect to their persons and
effects, remain free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.244
Although privacy, as manifested in the right of a woman to determine
whether or not to continue her pregnancy, is undoubtedly a subject of
great public controversy, there can be no question that a significant por-
tion of our contemporary society regards this right as one inherent in the
dignity of the individual. By application of these criteria it can thus be
seen that privacy is a fundamental right of constitutional stature. Pos-
sessed of this status, it should be confidently asserted against rival gov-
ernmental claims, whether federal or state.
By contrast, current constitutional privacy jurisprudence is unneces-
sarily muddled. Rather than grounding privacy rights squarely amid the
unenumerated natural rights secured by the ninth amendment, it uses as
its constitutional anchor the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. This due process source was first identified in Meyer
141. T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
142. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *119-20, *130.
143. This maxim has roots in English law that are recorded in decisional law as early as
1605. Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1605). According to Corwin,
the adage may have existed as early as Justinian's Digest. See Corwin, supra note 54, at 371
n.19.
144. Professor Caplan, however, asserts that
privacy as now understood.., did not develop until the mid-eighteenth century and
did not fully mature until the nineteenth. Privacy as an all-encompassing constitu-
tional right was accordingly not a part of the legal tradition inherited from England
by the colonies which would have been secured in either a state or federal bill of
rights.
Caplan, supra note 2, at 267 (footnotes omitted). It is noteworthy that Professor Caplan's
cited authorities all deal with the colonial experience in Puritan New England. A tradition of
far less governmental intrusion in private affairs existed in Rhode Island, New York, Penn-
sylvania, and, for a time, Maryland. See T. CURRY, supra note 76, at 29-77. Moreover,
Caplan's conclusion in this instance rests on the dubious assumption that ninth amendment
rights are static.
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v. Nebraska 145 as the constitutional agent which secured the liberty "to
marry, establish a home and bring up children." 146 Two years later
Pierce v. Society of Sisters 147 concluded that the same due process clause
protected "the liberty.., to direct the upbringing and education of chil-
dren.' 148 It is no accident that the Court selected the due process clauses
as the vehicle to secure these felt liberties. The doctrinal mainstream of
the Court in the 1920s was still in the channels of substantive due pro-
cess; locating these natural liberties among the substance of due process
liberties was both consistent and logical. But, as the Court has repudi-
ated substantive due process while reaffirming the constitutional legiti-
macy of privacy rights, it has created for itself unnecessary doctrinal
difficulties coupled with infirm restraints upon the privacy right. A jux-
taposition of two cases from the Court's 1985 Term, Bowers v. Hard-
wick 149 and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists150 highlights the quagmire into which the Court has
slipped. Before comparing Bowers and Thornburgh, however, it will be
useful to sketch the evolution of the doctrine.
Skinner v. Oklahoma 151 used equal protection as the mechanism to
strike down an Oklahoma statute permitting involuntary sterilization on
the ground that the statute intruded upon "the basic civil rights of
man"'152 and was wholly artificial in its application. The Court empha-
sized the fundamental nature of the right involved, marriage and procre-
ation, as the basis for the strict scrutiny to which the statute was
subjected. Skinner thus adumbrates the role which fundamental rights
play in modem equal protection analysis. Similarly, in Prince v. Massa-
chusetts '53 the Court reaffirmed, on due process grounds, that there is a
"realm of family life which the state cannot enter"' 154 without compelling
justification. In the highly charged atmosphere of racial discrimination,
145. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Meyer was not the first case to allude to a constitutionally
protected privacy right. As early as 1886, the fourth and fifth amendments were held to "ap-
ply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property .. " Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
146. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
147. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
148. Id. at 534-35.
149. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
150. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
151. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
152. Id. at 541.
153. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
154. Id. at 166.
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the Warren Court concluded, in Loving v. Virginia,155 that a state statute
barring racially mixed marriage was offensive to the liberty of marriage
secured by the due process clauses. 156 During the same period, the Court
decided Griswold, in which the liberty interest protected was character-
ized in a concurrence by Justice White as the right "to be free of regula-
tion of the intimacies of the marriage relationship." 15 7 Similarly,
Eisenstadt v. Baird5 8 invalidated a Massachusetts statute prohibiting
contraceptive use by either married or unmarried couples. The Eisen-
stadt Court specifically dismissed marriage as a prerequisite for assertion
of the liberty interest there advanced, characterizing the protected right
as the "decision whether to bear or beget a child."'159 The watershed
cases of Roe v. Wade 160 and Doe v. Bolton 161 held that "a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" is among the liberty
interests protected by the due process clause. 162
To reach these conclusions the Court has first characterized the
claimed liberty interests as fundamental rights deserving of heightened
judicial protection.' 63 In sifting the fundamental from the incidental the
Court has used, as its sieve, concepts acquired from due process jurispru-
dence. Justice White, for example, categorizes fundamental rights as
either those "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed' "164 or those
"deeply rooted in the Nation's history and traditions."'16 5
Application of this doctrine during this past Term has produced
confusing, inconsistent results. In Bowers v. Hardwick 166 the Court, by a
five to four margin, concluded that a Georgia statute making private,
consensual anal or oral sex a felony did not violate the constitutional
privacy right as applied to homosexuals. To reach this conclusion Justice
White distinguished the earlier privacy cases as limited to rights of fam-
ily, marriage, or procreation, then proceeded to dismiss any claimed
155. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
156. The Court struck down the statute on equal protection grounds as well as finding that
the law deprived the Lovings of due process by denying them the "freedom of choice to
marry" that had "long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 12.
157. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
158. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
159. Id. at 453.
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
162. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
163. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
164. Id. at 2844 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
165. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
166. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
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right to engage in private, consensual anal or oral sex as both unrelated
to these identified rights and not deserving of characterization as a fun-
damental right. In reaching the latter result, Justice White relied heavily
on the historical facts that sodomy was a common-law crime, had been
made criminal by each of the original states when the Bill of Rights was
adopted in 1791, and was subject to criminal penalties in thirty-two of
the thirty-seven states in existence when the fourteenth amendment was
adopted in 1868. Perhaps most unfortunate was Justice White's express
refusal to evaluate the ninth amendment rights asserted in Hardwick's
initial complaint but, apparently, not explicitly urged upon the Court at
oral argument. 167
Even viewed as a due process case, Justice White's reasoning in
Bowers cannot withstand minimal, much less close, scrutiny. Assuming,
arguendo, that the fundamental rights secured by prior privacy case law
are limited to those revolving around family, marriage, or procreation,
Justice White's conclusory implication that no nexus can be found be-
tween anal or oral sexual activity and these identified rights is erroneous.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland 168 reminds us not to "close our eyes to
the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been
accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."' 169 As Justice Blackmun noted, "[w]e protect those rights not
because they contribute, in some direct and material way, to the general
public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's
life."'170 To Justice Stevens, "the concept of privacy embodies the 'moral
fact that a person belongs to himself and not to others nor to society as a
whole.' "171 Because "sexual intimacy is 'a sensitive, key relationship of
human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the de-
velopment of human personality,' "172 and the "ability independently to
define one's identity.., is central to any concept of liberty,"' 173 only "the
most willful blindness"' 7 4 can conclude that there is no linkage between
existing privacy guarantees and the right to engage in private, consensual
oral or anal sex.
167. Compare id. at 2846 & n.8 with id. at 2849-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
169. Id. at 501.
170. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2187 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fried, Corre-
spondence, 6 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 288-89 (1977)), quoted in Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
172. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
173. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
174. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
January 1987]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Moreover, because the Court chose to hem itself in by selective, and
artificially limited, tests of fundamental liberties, Justice White was able
to offer, as conclusive evidence of its lack of fundamental status, the his-
torical fact that sodomy was generally criminal in 1791 and 1868. This
mechanical assembly fails adequately to explain Loving v. Virginia, in
which the Court invalidated a Virginia statute outlawing interracial mar-
riage despite uncontroverted proof that the statute (and others like it)
had long historical roots. 175 The result in this case serves to further illus-
trate the bankruptcy of the due process analytical framework in the con-
text of fundamental liberties associated with privacy.176
Whatever conceptual scaffolding is erected, there is an uneasy dis-
175. 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967); see Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2854 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
other settings, the Court has vindicated fundamental rights despite impressive historical prohi-
bition of the claimed right. For example, since the Middle Ages, English law had provided for
the removal of an indigent from the community. This scheme persisted and finally resulted in
the 1662 Law of Settlement and Removal. This act was the model for similar colonial statutes.
Removal of a pauper was upheld by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Fallowfield Town-
ship v. Marlborough Township, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 32 (1776), and quashed on a technicality in
Upper Dublin Overseers of the Poor v. Germantown Overseers of the Poor, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
213 (1793). The Supreme Court generally validated state laws inhibiting the free movement of
indigents in City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142-43 (1837). Yet in Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), the Court struck down a California statute, which had
existed in some version since 1860, prohibiting the introduction into California of any indigent.
Mr. Justice Byrnes rejected these historical buttresses because they "no longer fit the facts."
Id. at 174. Edwards was decided under the commerce clause, but the right involved-freedom
of movement-is a fundamental right. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
176. The Bowers majority chose to skate by the fact that the Georgia statute at issue pro-
hibits, on its face, all oral or anal sex, wherever it may occur, whether between married or
unmarried heterosexuals or unmarried homosexuals. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). Thus,
the statute is facially suspect when analyzed in light of the most orthodox privacy precedents.
In its October 1986 Term, the Court has created further confusion in whatever doctrine
Bowers established. In Oklahoma v. Post, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3249 (Oct. 14, 1986) (No. 85-2071), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that a man's criminal conviction for consensual oral and anal sex with a woman
must be set aside because "the right to privacy, as formulated by the Supreme Court, includes
the right to select consensual adult sex partners." Id. at 1109. The Oklahoma court, writing
prior to Bowers, relied on Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), to reach this conclu-
sion. The court also explicitly relied, in part, on Justice Goldberg's Griswold concurrence
emphasizing the relevance of the ninth amendment to the Griswold holding. The Oklahoma
court was careful to limit its decision to consensual adult heterosexual sex, specifically dis-
avowing any application of the decision to homosexual activity.
Following Bowers, one would suppose that the Supreme Court would have granted certio-
rari, if only to correct summarily Oklahoma's presumably erroneous notion of constitutional
privacy rights. Its refusal to do so merely leads to further confusion. Is Bowers now to be
read as a denial only to homosexuals of the right to select consensual sex partners? Does the
Court wish to permit the states latitude to formulate independent notions of the limits of the
privacy right? If so, the desire is inefficacious without further explication of the grossly dispa-
rate results in Post and Bowers.
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harmony between Bowers and Thornburgh, decided just nineteen days
apart. In Thornburgh, the Court, again by a five to four margin, invali-
dated key portions of Pennsylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act, 177
which imposed restrictions upon the availability of abortions. In con-
cluding that a state may not "intimidate women into continuing
pregnancies"'178 by erecting powerful psychological and legal barriers to
an abortion, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional foundation of Roe v.
Wade. In doing so, Justice Blackmun observed:
Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a
promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept
largely beyond the reach of the government .... Few decisions are
more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision-with the
guidance of her physician and within the limits specified in Roe-
whether to end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice
freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would protect
inadequately a central part of the sphere of liberty that our law guaran-
tees equally to all. 17 9
Noteworthy by its absence is any mention of the precise constitutional
bedrock upon which these liberties are grounded. By implication, of
course, the due process clauses clothe these liberties with constitutional
protection. But, it is possible that Justice Blackmun, who briefly flirted
with the ninth amendment as an alternative source for protecting the
right claimed by Hardwick, 180 at least may be thinking about application
of the ninth amendment to privacy rights. If so, he may be alone, for
Justices Stevens, White, and Rehnquist plainly view the due process
clauses as the doctrinal source of the liberty interest protected by
Thornburgh.""'
B. Privacy and the Ninth Amendment
Would it make any difference if these issues were analyzed as
claimed unenumerated natural rights under the ninth amendment? The
initial inquiry, which has already been decided affirmatively within the
due process framework, is whether a privacy right, however manifested,
is constitutionally protected. As discussed above,1 82 privacy as an ab-
straction fits neatly into the template proposed for evaluation of prospec-
177. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201-3220 (1983).
178. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2178.
179. Id. at 2184-85 (citations omitted).
180. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2185 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 2194 (White, J.,
dissenting).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 133-44.
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tive unenumerated natural rights. Let us now examine the specific
claimed rights in Thornburgh and Bowers through the ninth amendment
lens.
In Thornburgh, the reconstructed ninth amendment claim is that a
woman has an unenumerated natural right to choose whether to continue
her pregnancy, without interference from the state in that decision. This
right finds textual warrant in several places: the fourth amendment's
guarantee of "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons," the
first amendment's guarantee of free association, 183 and the third amend-
ment's limited guarantee of the inviolability of the home.184
The right has historical authenticity. To be sure, it is disingenuous
to claim that a woman's right to control her pregnancy has been ex-
pressly recognized since the nation's formation. Such an inquiry is
hollow because abortion, like computers and video machinery, was sim-
ply not a part of the landscape in the late eighteenth century. 185 To at-
tempt to disprove the claimed right in such fashion is "to use history as
drunks use lamposts-more for support than for illumination."' 186 The
proper historical inquiry is one which seeks to determine "what history
teaches are the traditions from which [the nation's constitutional juris-
prudence] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing."' 187 And that tradition is not slavishly devoted
to fidelity to past practice. In promoting the unratified Constitution,
Madison observed:
183. In speaking of "free association," I am loosely construing the specific guarantees of
the first amendment. Taken together, the animating impulse of the first amendment is to en-
sure freedom of thought, expression, assembly or association, and political participation.
Thought, expression, and association form the heart of individual autonomy and are essential
attributes of "the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their
intimate associations with others." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
184. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of
the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend.
III. Though this amendment may seem to be an antiquarian relic, its substance provides fur-
ther evidence of "original intent" that individual privacy be protected and preserved.
185. Abortion performed before "quickening"-recognizable movement of the fetus-was
not a common-law crime. 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *50; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*125-26. Although Lord Coke believed that abortion after quickening was "a great misprision,
and no murder," 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *50, and Blackstone styled the offense less severe
than manslaughter, I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125-26, some modem scholars be-
lieve abortion was never a common-law crime, whenever performed. See authorities collected
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 135 n.26. The first American legislation criminalizing abortion
was enacted by Connecticut in 1821. See id. at 138 n.29.
186. Abrams, Mr. Meese Caricatures the Constitution, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1986, at A31,
col. 6.
187. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Thorn-
burgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2189 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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[T]he glory of the people of America [is] that whilst they have paid a
decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they
have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for
names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowl-
edge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience. '8 8
To this spirit Madison attributed the Constitution's innovations "in favor
of private rights and public happiness."18 9 Without such resolution, "the
people of the United States... must at best have been laboring under the
weight of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest
of mankind." 190 Thus, the historical authenticity to be sought is the his-
torical current of constitutional thought. Viewed in this fashion, it is
plainly evident that "the balance struck by this country"191 has been
moving inexorably toward greater security and freedom, whether eco-
nomic or personal, for the female majority of this society.
The right claimed in Thornburgh is wholly consistent with the the-
ory of natural rights. It is not a right created by or dependent upon the
original grant of power from private citizens to the representative gov-
ernment. Nor could the right legitimately be invaded by private action
prior to the creation of the representative government which succeeded
to those private rights. Pregnancy is a uniquely personal condition, inex-
tricably linked with a woman's most intimate choices of association. To
suggest that a woman's rights concerning this condition flow from or can
be conditioned by the Lockean sovereign is to pervert horribly the polit-
ical theory that actuated the framers and that is embodied in the
Constitution. 192
Despite the emotion which the subject generates, a woman's right of
choice to continue her pregnancy unassailably turns on competing con-
ceptions of the inherent dignity of the individual. Even its opponents
frame their opposition in such terms, choosing to concentrate on the
inherent dignity of the embryonic individual rather than on that of the
acknowledged individual faced with the personal anguish of decision.
The ninth amendment right asserted in Bowers is, most abstractly,
the right of individuals to control the nature of their intimate associa-
tions with others. More concretely, it is a right to engage in private,
consensual sex acts without interference or limitations imposed by the
state. It is not limited to homosexuality, as the Bowers majority charac-
188. THE FEDERALIST No. 14 at 52 (J. Madison) (6th ed. 1847).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Thorn-
burgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2189 (Stevens, J., concurring).
192. See supra notes 50-57; infra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
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terized the claim. The textual foundation for the claimed right is found
most strongly in the fourth amendment, but powerful support is to be
enlisted from the first and third amendments. 193
Several sources provide historical support for the claimed right.
First, as the Bowers majority implicitly acknowledged, oral and anal sex
(or sodomy, to use the Court's preferred label) has existed as long as
humans have recorded history. The fact that sodomy has also been con-
sistently criminal is of no more force in Bowers than was the consistent
historic criminality of racially mixed marriages in Loving v. Virginia.1 94
Second, the privacy right has plainly evolved in the direction of more
extensive protection for the individual's intimate sexual choices. It is this
moving target of tradition which the Court should seek to hit, not some
static bull's-eye of historic public moral condemnation.1 95 Indeed, the
focus on historic public condemnation of sodomy only serves to remind
the reader that, behind the public posture, the condemned behavior has
persisted for millenia. It is a strange historical authenticity that focuses
on the reflections of history and fails to examine the deep pool of human
nature from which the reflections shine.
The right to engage freely in private, consensual sex is a paradig-
matic natural right. Can it be seriously contended that the social com-
pact creates the right to have sexual relations? What private right, to
which the state is the successor, could be asserted to circumscribe pri-
vate, consensual sexual behavior? Whatever arguments may be made
concerning the efficacy of natural rights theory, sex is one right which is
undeniably, and powerfully, natural.
Similarly, only the most withered of souls would contend that an
individual's personal choices of intimate relations are other than inextri-
cably linked to the inherent dignity of the individual. Even though the
right litigated in Bowers was seen to be morally loathsome to many, a
moment's objectivity on the part of the moral condemnors would lead to
an admission that an individual's choice of when to have private sex,
with whom, and in what fashion, is at the heart of the definition of indi-
vidual freedom.
193. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
194. The historical status of a claimed right (in 1791, 1868, or at any other time) is most
relevant to claims that the right is a ninth amendment civil or positive right and of little or no
relevance to claims that it is a natural right. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
195. The Bowers majority acknowledged this evolution of public choice yet drew a con-
trary conclusion from the facts. Although the past 25 years have marked the abandonment of
criminal penalties for sodomy by 27 states, the Bowers majority persisted in labelling "face-
tious" any argument that a right to engage in private, adult, consensual sex was historically
authentic. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2845; cf. supra note 176.
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The analytical apparatus used to test the sufficiency of an asserted
ninth amendment natural right bears many similarities to the criteria em-
ployed in evaluating claimed fundamental rights in the context of due
process. However, the text of the ninth amendment, its historical gene-
sis, and the structural role it plays in the Constitution provide important
and crucial differences. Viewed most literally, the amendment enjoins
constitutional interpreters from denying or disparaging unenumerated
rights on the basis of the absence of a textual warrant. Thus, contempo-
rary concern about the absence of an explicit textual foundation for an
asserted fundamental right such as privacy 96 becomes of no consequence
when the claimed right is advanced as an unenumerated natural right
protected by the ninth amendment. Nevertheless, prudential concerns
mandate some textual foundation apart from the ninth amendment it-
self.197 The significant difference from due process analysis is that the
textual fidelity required to support a claimed ninth amendment natural
right is minimal. When the claimed right is consistent with the theoreti-
cal construct of natural rights and a significant portion of contemporary
society acknowledges that the right is inherent in the concept of individ-
ual dignity, textual fidelity is absolutely supplied by the ninth amend-
ment itself.
The historical genesis of the ninth amendment provides ample sup-
port for the conclusion that contemporary expositors of the Constitution
ought to be generous in their acceptance of claimed natural rights. The
limiting principles suggested are prudential only, are not mandated by
the Lockean political theory which actuated the Constitution and Bill of
Rights, are not required by the text of the amendment, and were proba-
bly not even considered by the framers. Nevertheless, they are appropri-
ate minimal standards to winnow the substantial from the frivolous.
The structural role played by the ninth amendment is often conve-
niently overlooked. It is a counterweight to the vast momentum gener-
ated by governmental power. This is an important, even vital, structural
role that is only partially filled by other constitutional guarantees and
196. Justice White best expressed this concern in his opinions in both Thornburgh, 106 S.
Ct. at 2194 (White, J., dissenting), and Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. The necessity for an "ex-
plicit textual warrant" for the right asserted in Thornburgh was argued by Solicitor General
Fried in the federal government's amicus brief in support of Pennsylvania: "There is no ex-
plicit textual warrant in the Constitution for a right to abortion .... [T]he further afield
interpretation travels from its point of departure in the text, the greater the danger that consti-
tutional adjudication will be like a picnic to which the framers bring the words and the judges
the meaning." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 24,
Thornburgh, reprinted in L.A. Daily J., Aug. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
197. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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prohibitions. Indeed, by its terms the amendment is the final counter-
weight, to be used against governmental intrusion upon the people when
all else fails. It is precisely this role which the ninth amendment should
play in privacy jurisprudence. It is perhaps due to its absence from the
text that the constitutional right of privacy assumes such a tortured
shape.
Moreover, the ninth amendment springs from and helps effectuate
John Locke's conception of representative government, which is so
deftly embodied in the entire Constitution. Lockean theory posits that
each man is his own master. In the Lockean state of nature, no political
control of any kind is exerted upon the individual. 198 Yet, upon forma-
tion of government, some individual rights are ceded to the state for the
purpose of more fully securing the liberty of all. Thus "[r]epresentative
government begins with the premise that the state's rights against its citi-
zens are no greater than the sum of the rights of the individuals whom it
benefits in any given transaction. The state qua state has no independent
set of entitlements ...."199 Because the state possesses only limited
rights derived entirely from individual constituents, it cannot regulate
individual behavior in any greater fashion than could the individual
members of society regulate the behavior of their fellows. To be sure,
one purpose of the state is to assume and enforce community powers of
self-help to prevent individuals from seizing, through force or fraud,
what is not rightfully their own. Accordingly, the Lockean state is em-
powered to curb rape, murder, pillage, plunder, and other conduct that
uses force or deceit to deprive others of what is justly their own. Viewed
in light of Lockean political theory, there is no room for state interven-
198. This is not to say that in the theoretical state of nature there are no social controls.
Even a politically unorganized society is likely to have a common language, culture, or tradi-
tion, and ethical conceptions of right and wrong. These social controls are not enforced by the
state, however, and this distinction is significant in contemplating the implications of Lockean
theory.
199. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 51, at 331. Locke's view of legislative power was as follows:
First, It is not nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and for-
tunes of the people. For it being but the joint power of every member of society given
up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator, it can be no more than those
persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave it up to the
community. For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself,
and nobody has absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other to destroy
his own life, or to take away the life or property of another.
J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 135 (1690). Epstein's view of the governmental powers
vested in the Lockean state is forcefully clear: "The sovereign has no absolute power to gener-
ate rights. The state can acquire nothing by simple declaration of its will but must justify its
claims in terms of the rights of the individuals whom it protects .... " R. EPSTEIN, supra note
51, at 12; see also Corwin, supra note 54, at 383-94.
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tion in matters so basic to personal autonomy as sex and procreation.
Absent force or fraud, one's choice of a sex partner and sex practices are
not susceptible to regulation by private action, to which the state is but
the successor. Similarly, so long as a fetus is regarded as simply one who
would be a citizen, 2° a woman's choice concerning pregnancy lacks any
element of force which could provide a theoretical justification for state
intervention.
Only by ignoring the fundamental political theory embodied in the
Constitution can the state be ceded power to intervene in this private
arena. The ninth amendment, in current constitutional jurisprudence, is
an in-tended sentry post on the frontier of representative government.
Restoration of its intended function would serve as a welcome reminder
that "[t]he state is not the source of individual rights or of social commu-
nity" 201 but, rather, that the state merely possesses private rights of ac-
tion which it can exercise for the community benefit. Since individuals
lack private-law means of prohibiting private behavior that is not forcibly
or deceitfully intrusive upon others, the state is similarly lacking in
power. That fundamental nugget of political theory is at the heart of any
conception of unenumerated natural rights. It is that vision of represen-
tative government that the ninth amendment serves and imposes as an
outer boundary upon government action.
VI. Conclusion
The ninth amendment was born amid the heightened concern for
both state sovereignty and individual liberty that marked the adoption of
the Bill of Rights. It was specifically intended as a catch-all to preserve
for the people their great and fundamental rights that were not enumer-
ated in the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution. Its
text mandates treatment of these unspecified rights on a par with the
enumerated rights. The framers recognized the source of these
unenumerated rights to be largely state common, constitutional, and stat-
utory law. But, because they conceived of both enumerated and
unenumerated rights as consisting of positive and natural rights, they
recognized an additional, transcendent source of these rights.
Ninth amendment rights are enforceable against the federal govern-
ment because it is textually logical to do so and because it is not inconsis-
tent with the framers' intent. Since ninth amendment positive rights are
state-based, but federal in character, they pose unique potential conflicts
200. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2188 (Stevens, J., concurring).
201. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 51, at 333.
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with the supremacy clause. The conflicts are resolvable in part by limit-
ing their state foundation to pre-1788 state law. Natural, or fundamen-
tal, ninth amendment rights pose no such conflict with federal action.
While the ninth amendment was not intended to bar state action, to
do so is consistent with and efficacious of the due process and republican
government guarantees of the Constitution, for in the case of positive
rights it would merely compel the states to observe their own laws. Nat-
ural or fundamental ninth amendment rights are enforceable against the
states because the theoretical understanding of the ninth amendment res-
ervation, in this instance, is to vest these rights in the people, rather than
in any government. Being paramount by nature, such rights pose no real
conflict with the apparently conflicting original intent of the framers.
Divining fundamental rights in a principled fashion poses problems
of noninterpretive judicial review. To eliminate or minimize these
problems, courts must recognize as fundamental only those rights which
have some textual foundation in the Constitution, can claim historical
authenticity in traditional sources of our organic law, are consistent with
the theoretical understanding of natural rights, and command recogni-
tion as inherent in personal dignity by a substantial portion of contempo-
rary society. As a guide, courts should keep in mind the Lockean
principle which the ninth amendment was intended to effectuate: the
state can only exercise coercive powers which its constituent members
could legitimately exercise in self-defense.
The result of this reading of the ninth amendment is to revive the
amendment as a keystone of federalism and as a source of substantive,
fundamental personal liberties. Without corresponding changes in other
constitutional sources of regulation of federal-state relations, the ninth
amendment will not revolutionize federalism. It will, however, provide
new life to the states as protectors of the liberties of their citizens against
federal encroachment. At the same time, assertion of fundamental ninth
amendment rights will operate to prevent the federal or state govern-
ments from invading the reserved personal liberties of the people. It is a
challenging amendment; it should not languish in desuetude because of
the challenge it poses.
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